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ABSTRACT: Ralph Johnson argues that mathematical proofs lack a dialectical tier, and thereby do not 
qualify as arguments. This paper argues that, despite this disavowal, Johnson's account provides a compel-
ling model of mathematical proof. The illative core of mathematical arguments is held to strict standards of 
rigour. However, compliance with these standards is itself a matter of argument, and susceptible to chal-
lenge. Hence much actual mathematical practice takes place in the dialectical tier. 
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1. THE DANCE OF MATHEMATICAL PRACTICE 
What is mathematics about? A standard answer has long been that mathematics is con-
cerned with the derivation of formal proofs. And yet, as the mathematician David Ruelle 
points out, truly formal proof has little to do with actual mathematical practice: 
Human mathematics consists in fact in talking about formal proofs, and not actually perform-
ing them. One argues quite convincingly that certain formal texts exist, and it would in fact 
not be impossible to write them down. But it is not done: it would be hard work, and useless 
because the human brain is not good at checking that a formal text is error-free. Human 
mathematics is a sort of dance around an unwritten formal text, which if written would be un-
readable. This may not seem very promising, but human mathematics has in fact been prodi-
giously successful. (Ruelle 2000: 254) 
Explaining that success poses a problem for philosophy of mathematics as traditionally 
conceived. If mathematical practice were ultimately reducible to formal proof, which has 
been analysed in great detail in mathematical logic, then actual practice would differ only 
in degree from the elementary and/or foundational work upon which most philosophers 
of mathematics concentrate. But if mathematical practice cannot be understood solely in 
such terms, then philosophy of mathematics needs to pay it much closer attention. 
 In recent decades, some philosophers of mathematics have indeed begun to take 
a broader range of mathematical practice into account. Important milestones include 
(Pólya 1954), (Lakatos 1976), and (Kitcher 1984). In the last decade the pace has quick-
ened. (Corfield 2002) is an explicit manifesto for a new, integrative field of research 
bringing together insights from philosophy of mathematics, history of mathematics, soci-
ology of mathematics, mathematics education, and mathematics itself. Corfield’s subse-
quent book, (Corfield 2003), makes good on some of this promise, which has been devel-
oped further by many authors, including contributors to (Hersh 2006), (Van Kerkhove 
and Van Bendegem 2007), (Van Kerkhove et al. 2010), and (Löwe and Müller 2010). 
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2. JOHNSON’S TWO TIER MODEL OF ARGUMENT 
In Manifest Rationality (2000), Ralph Johnson has provided a thoughtful and influential 
analysis of non-mathematical argument. He characterizes arguments as containing two 
levels—an ‘illative core’, in which the support that premisses provide for the conclusion 
is set out, and a ‘dialectical tier’, in which the proponent of the argument responds to po-
tential or actual criticism. Hans Hansen summarizes Johnson’s position as follows: The 
illative core comprises  
a thesis, T, supported by a set of reasons, R’, whereas the ‘dialectical tier must be a set of or-
dered pairs, with each pair consisting of an objection and one or more responses to the objec-
tion: thus: 
 
{⟨O1, {A1a, ..., A1n}⟩, ⟨O2, {A2a, ..., A2n}⟩, ..., ⟨ON, {ANa, ..., ANn}⟩} 
 
Now, in advancing a Johnson-argument, a proponent has to do two things: (i) he must assert 
T because R, and (ii) for every objection, Oi, to R-T, he is obligated to respond with one or 
more answers, Ai1 − Aij. (Hansen 2002: 271 f.) 
3. JOHNSON (AND HIS CRITICS) ON PROOF AND ARGUMENT 
Johnson contends that mathematical proofs do not qualify as arguments.
1
 This claim pro-
ceeds from his Principle of Vulnerability, that ‘if the arguer claims to have insulated the 
argument against all possible criticism, then this is no arguer and no argument’ (Johnson 
2000: 224). It follows from this principle that there cannot be any conclusive arguments, 
and yet proofs would seem to be clear examples of conclusive arguments. So, if John-
son’s principle is to survive, he must show that mathematical proofs are either not con-
clusive or not arguments. He defends the second of these alternatives, adducing four dif-
ferences between proof and argument: 
(P1) Proofs require axioms; arguments do not have axioms. 
(P2) Proofs must be deductive; arguments need not be.  
(P3) Proofs have necessarily true conclusions; almost all arguments have  
contingent conclusions.  
(P4) “[A]n argument requires a dialectical tier, whereas no mathematical proof has  
or needs to have such” (Johnson 2000: 232) 
I shall argue below that Johnson picked the wrong alternative. In his sense of ‘conclusive 
argument’, proofs are not conclusive, but they are arguments. Hence, suitably qualified, 
the Principle of Vulnerability may be preserved without jettisoning proof from the do-
main of argument. But first I should address some other criticism that Johnson’s position 
has attracted.
2
 
                                                 
1  Or at least, in his subsequent clarification, not paradigmatically (Johnson 2002: 316). 
2  I shall restrict my attention to critics who address Johnson directly. However, there are many other 
commentators who have made similar points. For example, Michael Crowe lists as ‘misconceptions’ 
several theses which closely resemble Johnson’s disanalogies, including ‘The methodology of mathe-
matics is deduction’, ‘Mathematics provides certain knowledge’, ‘Mathematical statements are invaria-
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3.1 The Four Colour Theorem 
The four colour theorem (4CT) states that four colours suffice to colour every planar map 
so that no neighbouring regions are the same colour. Johnson himself warns that the proof 
of 4CT ‘creates a potential problem’ for (P2), by undermining the position that proofs are 
necessarily deductive (Johnson 2000: 232). Presumably this problem arises because 4CT 
was the first and most widely discussed example of a theorem with a proof that can only be 
completed by computer. The proof involves a large set of configurations (633 in the most 
recent version) each of which has to be shown to possess a certain property (see Aberdein 
2007: 140, for a more detailed discussion). Each of these demonstrations was arrived at by 
a computer which had been programmed with a general method for their construction. This 
makes the full proof far too long to be verified by hand by any one human mathematician, 
although individual passages have been checked. Moreover, the whole proof has been in-
dependently shown to be error-free by a different computer program (Gonthier 2008). 
Hence it is a rare exception to Ruelle’s assertion that formal texts are not written down. 
 Of course, sceptics of computer-aided proof may very well ask why, if they did 
not trust the first computer program, they should be expected to trust the second. Nonethe-
less, the source of their anxiety is not, as Johnson would seem to imply, that the proof is 
non-deductive, but that it may be no proof at all. As Georges Gonthier, the architect of the 
computer-checked proof of 4CT, observes, “Coq [the proof assistant used] verifies that [the 
proof] strictly follows the rules of logic. Thus, our proof is more rigorous than a traditional 
one” (Gonthier 2008: 333). Gonthier is not begging the question against the sceptics when 
he insists that his proof is more rigorous; rather, he is identifying ‘rigour’ with deductive 
logic. It is still possible, if astronomically unlikely, that every program used either to prove 
4CT or to check the proof has run into undetectable bugs that have caused it to misfire. But 
otherwise, the proof was conducted in strict adherence with deductive logic. 
 4CT is not the only candidate for a non-deductive mathematical proof (for oth-
ers, see Baker 2009). However, although the existence of such a proof would contradict 
(P2), it is not clear why this should jeopardize Johnson’s position. He is not arguing that 
no arguments can be deductive, but rather that the relative importance of deductive argu-
mentation has been greatly overstated. So, since he concedes that there can be deductive 
arguments, the deductive nature of mathematical proofs may establish that they are an 
unusual sort of argument, but not that they are not arguments. 
3.2 Finocchiaro 
Maurice Finocchiaro observes of Johnson’s position that treating ‘geometrical proofs as 
not arguments but mere inferences or entailments ... would strike me as arbitrary insofar 
as Euclidean geometrical proofs are typically attempts to persuade oneself or others of the 
truth of the theorem in question by rational means’ (Finocchiaro 2003: 32). This would 
seem to be related to a point Finocchiaro made to Johnson on some earlier occasion: ‘Fi-
nocchiaro suggested that the difference between an argument and a proof is one of per-
spective. That is, a proof is an argument that has been found to have certain properties. I 
                                                                                                                                                 
bly correct’, ‘Mathematical proof is unproblematic’, and ‘The methodology of mathematics is radically 
different from the methodology of science’ (Crowe 1988: 260 ff.). 
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am not sure how to respond to this objection’ (Johnson 2000: 232). Johnson’s candour is 
striking and Finocchiaro’s point is a highly pertinent challenge to (P4), but as it stands, 
frustratingly condensed. His central idea seems to be that proofs are articulated in differ-
ent contexts, and often in a context in which the proof is intended to persuade. In this 
context, a dialectical tier is to be expected, but this need not be so in other contexts. 
3.3 Dove 
Ian Dove suggests a counterexample to (P1) and (P4): Cauchy’s proof of the Euler Con-
jecture (Dove 2007: 348). The Euler Conjecture expresses a relationship between the 
number of vertices (V), edges (E), and faces (F) of a polyhedron: V − E + F = 2. Imre 
Lakatos’s most celebrated work (Lakatos 1976) is a painstaking reconstruction of at-
tempts made by several nineteenth-century mathematicians to prove this conjecture. Cen-
tral to the story is Cauchy’s proof of 1813, to which a series of counterexamples was ad-
vanced by later mathematicians, resulting in a succession of reworked proofs and a sub-
stantial clarification of the original concepts. As Dove shows, Cauchy’s proof was not 
axiomatic, contrary to (P1), and in its subsequent history (as reconstructed by Lakatos) 
exhibited a sophisticated dialectical tier, contrary to (P4). 
 However, Lakatos’s reconstruction is not without its critics. As the editors of his 
posthumously published Proofs and Refutations (1976) observe, some mathematicians see 
the struggle to prove the Euler Conjecture as uncharacteristic of mathematical practice: 
‘while the method of proof-analysis described by Lakatos may be applicable to the study of 
polyhedra, a subject which is “near empirical” and where the counterexamples are easily vis-
ualisable, it may be inapplicable to “real” mathematics’ (Lakatos, 1976: ix). The editors do 
stress that Lakatos has other examples, and later writers have provided many more. Nonethe-
less, perhaps Johnson could preserve his characterization of proofs as not arguments by ex-
cluding these examples, and retreating to a statement about ‘typical proofs’, say.3 
3.4 Dufour 
Michel Dufour makes two criticisms of Johnson’s position. Firstly, he notes that some 
proofs ‘have been notoriously controversial, at least in their early days’ (Dufour 2011). 
This challenge to (P4) is similar to Dove’s, if much less explicit. Secondly, Dufour picks 
up on an important detail of Johnson’s presentation: 
Johnson adds an interesting epistemic comment about the relationship between proof and ar-
gument. ‘The proof that there is no greatest prime number is conclusive, meaning that anyone 
who knows anything about such matters sees that the conclusion must be true for the reasons 
given’ (Johnson, 2000: 232, Dufour’s emphasis). This is certainly true. But what happens 
when you just know some things, not any thing, in the mathematical field and you wonder if 
there is a greatest prime number? (Dufour 2011). 
                                                 
3  Such a move would be doubly ironic: Johnson would be exhibiting a strategy which Lakatos stigmatizes 
as ‘monster barring’, redefining a concept to exclude anomalous cases, as well as coming close to vio-
lating his own Principle of Vulnerability. 
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Like Finocchiaro, Dufour draws attention to the different sorts of context in which proofs 
may arise. Where there is an epistemic asymmetry, as in a classroom context, the dialec-
tical tier may be expected to play less of a role, since the student may take more on trust. 
4. PROOFS AND CONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS 
In the last section we saw that there have been a number of piecemeal challenges to John-
son’s contention that proofs are not arguments. More systematic criticism will require 
analysis of his characterization of ‘conclusive argument’. Johnson states four properties 
that a conclusive argument must exhibit: 
(C1) ‘Its premises would have to be unimpeachable or uncriticizable.’ 
(C2) ‘The connection between the premises and the conclusion would have  
to be unimpeachable—the strongest possible.’ 
(C3) ‘A conclusive argument is one that can successfully (and rationally) resist  
every attempt at legitimate criticism.’ 
(C3) ‘The argument would be regarded as a conclusive argument.’  
(Johnson 2000: 233 f.) 
Johnson argues that no argument can satisfy all four criteria. He takes it that proofs, if 
they were arguments, would satisfy the criteria, but he denies that they are arguments. I 
shall argue that proofs cannot satisfy all of these criteria either, so there need be no objec-
tion to their being admitted as arguments in Johnson’s system. 
 Actually, only two of these criteria are at issue: Johnson states that conclusive 
arguments are impossible ‘principally because of the difficulty of satisfying (C1) but also 
because of (C3)’ (Johnson 2000: 234). The other two criteria provide no such obstacle. 
Of (C2), which corresponds to (P2), deductive inference being an unimpeachable connec-
tion, Johnson notes that there is ‘no problem with satisfying this requirement’, since ar-
guments may be deductive (Johnson 2000: 233). (C4) introduces a new point, but an un-
controversial one. In its defence, Johnson returns to mathematical proof, observing right-
ly that ‘[p]art of being a proof is being regarded as a proof’ (Johnson 2000: 234). 
 So what of (C1) and (C3)? (C1) corresponds to (P1): the axioms of mathematics 
would be unimpeachable premisses. However, Johnson’s demonstration that no argument 
satisfies (C1) also shows why (P1) is no obstacle to proofs being arguments. Considering 
the project of relativizing (C1) to a discourse community in which some premiss may be 
treated as unimpeachable, Johnson notes that ‘that would not confer on that premise the 
status of being uncriticizable. Someone from outside that community of discourse might 
well have a legitimate criticism of the statement’ (Johnson 2000: 233). But this is exactly 
the situation with axioms. By choosing to operate within a given axiomatic system, the 
mathematician undertakes to treat a set of axioms as uncriticizable. But other mathemati-
cians (or the same mathematician in other moods) may still challenge these axioms from 
the perspective of other systems. While this would be quixotic for the most firmly en-
trenched axioms, it is commonplace for more controversial cases, such as the Axiom of 
Choice, or large cardinal axioms. (C3) shares with (P4) a focus on the dialectical tier: 
according to (P4) mathematical proofs have no dialectical tier; according to (C3) conclu-
sive arguments would have an unbeatable dialectical tier. Johnson is right that (C3) sets a 
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standard that no argument can meet, so it is no discredit to their rigour that proofs do not 
meet it either. 
 
Type of  
Dialogue 
Initial  
Situation 
Main  
Goal 
Goal of  
Protagonist 
Goal of  
Interlocutor 
 
Inquiry 
Open-
mindedness 
Prove or  
disprove  
conjecture 
Contribute  
to outcome 
Obtain 
knowledge 
 
Deliberation 
Open-
mindedness 
Reach a  
provisional 
conclusion 
Contribute  
to outcome 
Obtain  
warranted  
belief 
 
Persuasion 
Difference  
of opinion 
Resolve  
difference  
of opinion 
with rigour 
Persuade  
interlocutor 
Persuade  
protagonist 
 
Negotiation 
Difference  
of opinion 
Exchange  
resources for  
a provisional 
conclusion 
Contribute  
to outcome 
Maximize  
value of  
exchange 
 
Debate  
(Eristic) 
Irreconcilable 
difference  
of opinion 
Reveal  
deeper conflict 
Clarify  
position 
Clarify  
position 
 
Information-
Seeking  
(Pedagogical) 
Interlocutor 
lacks  
information 
Transfer of 
knowledge 
Disseminate 
knowledge  
of results  
and methods 
Obtain 
knowledge 
 
 
Fig. 1. Some mathematical dialogue types 
We saw in the last section that (P4) may be challenged by drawing attention to the con-
text in which proofs are produced. I shall now make this challenge more precise. In 
Douglas Walton’s account of argument an important role is played by the ‘type of dia-
logue’. Dialogue types include persuasion, negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information-
seeking, and quarrel. They may be distinguished in terms of their initial situation, and the 
shared and individual aims of their participants (see, for example Walton and Krabbe 
1995: 80). For Walton, different argumentational practices are legitimate in different 
types of dialogue, so the evaluation of arguments must have regard to the type of dia-
logue in which they are advanced. Elsewhere, I have argued that mathematical discourse 
also exhibits a diversity of dialogue types, similar to Walton’s, and that the analysis of 
proofs should have regard to the type of dialogue in which the proof arises (Aberdein 
2007: 144 ff.). Fig. 1 summarizes a variety of mathematical dialogue types, some of 
which are more appropriate for successful proof than others (cf. Walton and Krabbe 
1995: 66). Finocchiaro’s criticism can now be understood as the positive point that proofs 
are frequently advanced in persuasion dialogues, a context in which the interlocutor may 
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be expected to raise objections to which the protagonist should have replies if the proof is 
to be accepted. Examples of persuasion dialogues of this sort include the presentation of 
new work and journal refereeing. Conversely, Dufour alludes to pedagogical, infor-
mation-seeking dialogues, in which objections may also arise, but it may sometimes be 
admissible to ignore them (if, for example, a satisfactory answer would be unintelligible 
without a depth of knowledge that the student lacks). 
 Johnson, however, is sceptical about dialogue types, suspecting Walton of an 
unduly broad characterization of argument (Johnson 2000: 177). This has the effect of 
stranding him in a single type of dialogue. His conception of mathematical proof appears 
to be limited to an inquiry conducted by logically omniscient individuals. In such a con-
text objections would never be raised, so the dialectical tier would indeed be empty, but 
this is, of course, an idealized fiction. However, if Johnson’s account is augmented with 
Walton-style mathematical dialogue types, it becomes a supple and versatile instrument, 
that, as I shall argue in the next section, can contribute decisively to the understanding of 
mathematical practice. 
5. TIERS OF MATHEMATICAL REASONING 
Many mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics have observed the dual nature of 
mathematical proof: proofs must be both persuasive and rigorous. The passage from  
Ruelle quoted above is one example. Here is another from a more famous mathematician, 
G.H. Hardy: 
If we were to push it to its extreme we should be led to a rather paradoxical conclusion; that 
we can, in the last analysis, do nothing but point; that proofs are what Littlewood and I call 
gas, rhetorical flourishes designed to affect psychology, pictures on the board in the lecture, 
devices to stimulate the imagination of pupils. ... On the other hand it is not disputed that 
mathematics is full of proofs, of undeniable interest and importance, whose purpose is not in 
the least to secure conviction. Our interest in these proofs depends on their formal and aes-
thetic properties. Our object is both to exhibit the pattern and to obtain assent. (Hardy 1928: 
18, his emphasis) 
It follows from this account that ‘proof’ is ambiguous between two different activities: 
‘exhibiting the pattern’ and ‘obtaining assent’. In most circumstances both activities must 
be satisfactorily performed for the proof to be a success. There are some special cases, 
such as proofs that have been fully formalized, or have been reified as mathematical ob-
jects, where only the first activity is attempted. That sort of ‘proof’ may be harmlessly 
identified with its illative core. But in the more characteristic sense of ‘proof’ we need 
more than this; we need a dialectical interaction with the mathematical community. For 
Richard Epstein, proofs intended to obtain assent are arguments by means of which 
mathematicians convince each other that the corresponding inferences are valid. He rep-
resents this situation schematically (Fig. 2). 
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   A Mathematical Proof 
    Assumptions about how to reason and communicate 
 
     A Mathematical Inference 
      Premises 
 
        argument  
         necessity 
 
      Conclusion 
 
    The mathematical inference is valid 
Fig. 2. Epstein's picture of mathematical proof (Epstein 2008: 419) 
Proofs are typically made up of many steps, not all of which are necessarily developed with 
the same rigour. So closer examination of proofs will represent them not as single argu-
ments but as structures of arguments (technically trees, or directed acyclic graphs). Hence 
the construction of proofs requires the articulation of two parallel structures: an inferential 
structure of formal derivations linking formal statement to formal statement, and an argu-
mentational structure of arguments by which mathematicians attempt to convince each oth-
er of the soundness of the inferential structure. Fig. 3 summarizes this picture. 
 
 Argumentational Structure  Inferential Structure 
 Mathematical Proof, Pn   Mathematical Inference, In 
 Endoxa: Data accepted by   Premisses: Axioms or statements  
 mathematical community   formally derived from axioms 
 
    argument     derivation 
 
 
 Claim: In is sound    Conclusion: An additional formally  
       expressed statement 
Fig. 3. The parallel structure of mathematical proof 
The relationship between the corresponding steps in the inferential and argumentational 
structures is broadly that between illative core and dialectical tier. One might object that 
the argumentational structure contains more than just objections and replies: it has its 
own theses and reasons. There is a close overlap of content between the nodes of the two 
structures, since the nodes of the argumentational structure assert that the corresponding 
nodes of the inferential structure have been soundly derived. Nonetheless, the argumenta-
tional structure must contain additional data, namely facts about the acceptability of vari-
ous inferential moves within the mathematical community. However, this could in princi-
ple be couched in the form of answers to objections. Hence the presence of a dialectical 
tier should be seen as characteristic of mathematical proof, at least in the sense in which it 
is concerned with obtaining assent. Where the steps in the inferential structure are un-
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problematic—since they are fully worked out formal derivations, or more typically, it is 
clear how they could be—the argumentational structure can be very light; it need do no 
more than point (as Hardy puts it) at the steps of the inferential structure. But where the 
derivation is more complex or contested, much more of the burden of the proof rests on 
the argumentational structure. In those circumstances it becomes critical to track and pro-
vide responses to the objections that may be raised to the gaps in the inferential structure. 
 This account both conserves and transcends the conventional view of mathemat-
ical proof. The illative core of mathematical arguments is held to strict standards of rig-
our, without which the proof would not qualify as mathematical. However, the step-by-
step compliance of the proof with these standards is itself a matter of argument, and sus-
ceptible to challenge. Hence much actual mathematical practice takes place in the dialec-
tical tier. Careful demarcation of these two levels is essential to the proper understanding 
of mathematics; a virtue of Johnson’s account is that attention may be directed to the dia-
lectical tier without undermining the rigour of the illative core. If this account is correct, 
important concepts in the philosophy of mathematics, such as mathematical rigour and 
mathematical explanation, can only properly be addressed when both of the parallel struc-
tures are accounted for. Mathematicians have a sophisticated grasp of the inferential struc-
ture. But we still need a system for analysis and appraisal of the argumentational structure. 
Despite Johnson’s disavowal, his account may contribute significantly to this pursuit. 
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I am honoured to be asked to comment on the paper by Andrew Aberdein on the Dialec-
tical Tier of Mathematical Proof, for although I have been interested in this area for many 
years, I have not been active in it lately. 
 The paper addresses the question of what mathematics is about, and it does so in 
an interesting way. It is generally agreed that part of mathematical proof is to make sure 
that “everything is correct,” i.e. that all logical inferences, etc., are correct. But part of 
mathematical proof is to convince others—mathematicians, students and assorted others—
of the correctness of the proof, either just in its own right, or in defence against objections. 
 Aberdein mentions, inter alia, the famous four colour theorem. This is one of the 
most famous theorems that, so far at least, can only be proved with the aid of a computer, 
since a number of cases have to be dealt with, and these are too many and too complex to 
be done by hand. As Aberdein points out, this may be seen by sceptics as a problem—
why trust one computer program when another may have the same flaw?—but to com-
puter science people like myself, who can verify by hand that the computer codes of the 
two or more programs are truly independent, this does not seem like a serious objection.
1
  
 Some of us may remember Euclidean geometry, and proofs of such theorems as 
that of Pythagoras, or the theorem that asserts that, in any triangle, the lines from each angle 
to the mid-point of the opposite side, meet in one point. Aberdein comments on geometrical 
proofs, but I think he is right when he says that (geometrical) proofs are often articulated in 
a context in which the proof is intended to persuade: to make a geometric proof fully ‘wa-
tertight’ would require a lot of additional machinery. But that, surely, is part of the issue: per-
suading one's audience is part of the task, as well as making sure that the proof is correct. 
 Aberdein also mentions, and briefly discusses the Euler conjecture relating the 
number of vertices, edges and faces of a polyhedron. 
 A brief mention of the proof that there is no greatest prime number is of some 
interest. The proof is conclusive to those who know at least some things about number 
theory, but Aberdein wonders, with Dufour, what happens when “you just know some 
things...” Here it is a case of whom you’re trying to convince.2 Well, in the end I’m 
tempted to say, “tough.” 
                                                 
1
 When I was a graduate student at the University of Waterloo in the late 60s, the 4CT was still the four 
colour conjecture, and I and my fellow graduate students spent much time trying to prove the 4CT.  
Several of us independently re-discovered the five colour theorem. 
2
 The proof is one by contradiction: assume there is a greatest prime number, P. Then multiply all the 
prime numbers between 2 and P, and then add 1. The resulting number is clearly greater than P, and is 
prime, thereby contradicting the assumption that P is the greatest prime number. This proof, though 
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 But now we really get to the crux of the matter: is a dialectical tier necessary 
and/or useful? And it strikes me that it is. 
 There is, clearly, a big difference between talking about mathematics and doing 
mathematics, and also between talking about mathematics and teaching mathematics. 
When a mathematician encounters a problem, he or she uses all the tools at his or her 
disposal to prove the conjecture
3
, and this almost certainly involves the dialectical tier. 
 But moreover, one needs to convince oneself and others of the correctness of the 
proof, and here's where the dialectical tier really “kicks in.” Once one is satisfied that the 
proof is correct, one can start worrying about the niceties of making sure all the details 
have been filled in.  
 As Aberdein points out, “ ‘proof’ is ambiguous between two different activities: 
‘exhibiting the pattern’ and ‘obtaining assent’. In most cases we need a “dialectical inter-
action with the mathematical community.” 
 The dialectical tier is important. 
                                                                                                                                                 
simple, is somewhat subtle and may not convince the mathematically uninitiated: it may need a lot of 
further explanation to convince the uninitiated. 
3
 Or to disprove it, as the case may be: one of my fellow graduate students in the late 60s tried for months 
to prove a conjecture by his supervisor. When he did not succeed, he tried to find a counter example, 
and he did find one in a matter of hours. 
